Fiscal-audit separation and government disclosure quality |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, PR China;2. NUS Business School, National University of Singapore, Mochtar Riady Building, BIZ 1, #07-19, 15 Kent Ridge Drive, Singapore 119245, Singapore;3. School of Business and Management, Shanghai International Studies University, 1550 Wenxiang Road, Songjiang District, Shanghai 201620, PR China;4. Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 1954 Huashan Road, Shanghai 200030, PR China;5. Government Accounting Research Institute, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, 182# Nanhu Avenue, East Lake High-tech Development Zone, Wuhan, Hubei 430073, PR China;1. University of Michigan-Flint, Flint, MI, United States;2. Miami University, Oxford, OH, United States;3. University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, United states;4. Old Dominion Unversity, Norfolk, VA, United States;1. University of Eastern Piedmont and CeRP-Collegio Carlo Alberto, Italy;2. University of Turin and CeRP-Collegio Carlo Alberto, Italy;3. Commissione di Vigilanza sui Fondi Pensione, Italy;1. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;2. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100085, China;3. School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University, Singapore 188065, Singapore;4. College of Economics and Management, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China;1. Fort Lewis College, School of Business Administration EBH #174, 1000 Rim Drive, Durango, CO 81301, USA;2. Louisiana State University, 2833 Business Education Complex North, 501 South Quad Drive, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA;3. Louisiana State University, 2821 Business Education Complex North, 501 South Quad Drive, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA;4. Louisiana State University, 2836 Business Education Complex North, 501 South Quad Drive, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA;1. Department of Accountancy, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;2. School of Accountancy, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, United States |
| |
| Abstract: | We show that the separation of the fiscal and audit offices of China’s province-level governments leads to high fiscal disclosure quality, an effect that is more pronounced when the political rank of the official in charge of auditing is higher than that of the official in charge of fiscal matters. Dynamically, disclosure quality decreases when fiscal office and audit office go from being separated to being integrated and improves when they go from being integrated to being separated. Finally, fiscal disclosure quality reduces the cost of debt and improves credit ratings of municipal investment and development bonds. We demonstrate an aspect of China’s governance that, even without adequate monitoring from the oppositions or the media, local governments can improve efficiency via horizontal separations of fiscal and audit offices. |
| |
| Keywords: | Fiscal-audit separation Fiscal disclosure quality Political rank Cost of debt Credit ratings |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
