Redistribution,taxes, and the median voter |
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Institution: | 1. Division of Nephrology and Hypertension, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota, USA;2. Department of Nephrology, The Affiliated Hospital of Xuzhou Medical College, Xuzhou, China;3. Division Cardiovascular Disease, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota, USA;2. Department of Economics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden |
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Abstract: | We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the “bang-bang” property. |
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