The impact of financial reporting flexibility on auditor risk judgement: Evidence from the implementation of FIN 46R |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Monash University, Australia;2. The University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Business and Economics, Hong Kong;3. Nottingham University Business School China, China;4. West Texas A&M University, Canyon, TX, United States;1. University of Michigan-Flint, Flint, MI, United States;2. Miami University, Oxford, OH, United States;3. University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, United states;4. Old Dominion Unversity, Norfolk, VA, United States;1. Department of Business Administration, University of Patras, University Campus, 26504 Rio - Patras, Greece;2. Department of Mathematics, University of Patras, University Campus, 26504 Rio – Patras, Greece;1. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;2. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100085, China;3. School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University, Singapore 188065, Singapore;4. College of Economics and Management, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China;1. UNSW Sydney, School of Accounting, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia;2. University of Western Australia, Accounting and Finance, Perth, WA 6009, Australia;2. Department of Accounting, H. Wayne Huizenga College of Business, Nova Southeastern University, 3301 College Avenue, Fort Lauderdale FL 33314, United States |
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| Abstract: | This paper investigates how auditors respond, in terms of their pricing and audit work, to a reduction of clients’ financial reporting discretion upon the implementation of FIN 46R, which requires firms to consolidate the variable interest entities (VIE) under their control. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that auditors charge relatively fewer audit fees and have shorter audit report lags for firms that are significantly affected by FIN 46R, compared to a group of control firms. This result concurs with the view that auditors react favorably to the reduction of clients’ financial reporting discretion. Our finding is concentrated among clients with higher accrual earnings management constraints, auditors with less client-specific knowledge, and auditors who have no recent experience of audit failures (e.g., severe client restatements). Our results are robust to alternative identifications of treatment and control samples, and our conclusion remains valid after controlling for the contemporaneous adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. We also show that the relatively reduced audit fees and audit effort do not lead to the deterioration of audit quality. |
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