两种产权保护度下软件价格决定的博弈分析

软件产权交易契约的环境和条件发生变化,导致交易者在交易中采取不同的价格博弈策略。在"完全"产权保护下,厂商从保护地盘和获取长期垄断利润的需要出发采取阻止竞争者进入的"满意"价格策略;在"中度"产权保护下,厂商和消费者在双方都没有绝对的交易控制力的条件下采取"混合"价格策略。企业和消费者对软件价格的博弈与用户基础、事后支持服务、网络外部性等"非供求因素"紧密关联,体现出一种多重垄断、竞争和策略的均衡。

A Game Analysis on the Software Price Strategy Under the Two Degrees of Property Right Protection

The change of situation and conditions in software property right transaction leads to different price game strategies during the transaction on the part of the dealers.Under "full" property rights protection,the software enterprises adopt the "satisfactory" pricing strategy with an aim to secure market and gain long-term profit and exclude other competitors.Under "medium-degree" property rights protection,both the enterprise and consumer do not have absolute power to control the transaction contract,so they choose the "mixed" price strategy.The software price game between the software enterprise and consumer relate to "the non-supply and demand factor",including user foundation,supporting service,the network effecting and so on.It is a kind of equilibrium between the multiple monopoly,competition and strategy.