Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games |
| |
| Authors: | Xavier Vives |
| |
| Institution: | (1) IESE Business School, Avenida Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, Spain;(2) Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain |
| |
| Abstract: | We provide sufficient conditions in finite-horizon multi-stage games for the value function of each player, associated to
extremal Markov perfect equilibria, to display strategic complementarities and for the contemporaneous equilibrium to be increasing
in the state variables.
The author is grateful to Federico Echenique, Rabah Amir and one anonymous referee for useful comments, project SEJ2005-08263 at
UPF and Project Consolider-Ingenio CSD2006-00016 of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, and the Barcelona Economics
Program of CREA, for financial support. |
| |
| Keywords: | Markov game Supermodularity Two-stage game Linear-quadatric game Adjustment costs Learning curve Network effects |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
