Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions |
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Authors: | Holburn, Guy L. F. Vanden Bergh, Richard G. |
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Affiliation: | University of Western Ontario |
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Abstract: | We draw on the positive political theory and campaign financeliteratures to examine how interest groups allocate influenceactivities (e.g., monetary donations, lobbying) across multiplegovernment institutions when seeking more favorable agency policydecisions. By modeling agency behavior in the context of legislativeoversight, we derive testable predictions about the politicalconditions under which an interest group will influence (1)only the agency, (2) the legislature and/or executive insteadof the agency, and (3) the legislature or executive in additionto the agency in order to induce a shift in regulatory policy.One implication of our conclusions relating to (2) and (3) isthat empirical studies seeking to identify a relationship betweenelectoral campaign contributions and public policy using dataon legislative votes are potentially misspecified. |
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