Regulatory Capture: A Review

This article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatureson regulatory capture. The scope is broad, but utility regulationis emphasized. I begin by describing the Stigler–Peltzmanapproach to the economics of regulation. I then open the blackbox of influence and regulatory discretion using a three-tierhierarchical agency model under asymmetric information (in thespirit of Laffont and Tirole, 1993). I discuss alternative modellingapproaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions,including models of common agency, revolving doors, informationallobbying, coercive pressure, and influence over committees.I discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes.I also review evidence on the revolving-door phenomenon andon the impact that different methods for selecting regulatorsappear to have on regulatory outcomes. The last section containsopen questions for future research. Footnotes ¹ E-mail address: dalbo{at}haas.berkeley.edu