The power of ESS: An experimental study |
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Authors: | Berninghaus Siegfried K Ehrhart Karl-Martin |
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Institution: | (1) Institute of Statistics and Mathematical Economics, University of Karlsruhe, Postfach 6980, 76128 Karlsruhe, Germany (e-mail: Siegfried.Berninghaus@wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de) , DE |
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Abstract: | Abstract. Our experimental design mimics a traditional evolutionary game framework where players are matched pairwise to play a symmetric
33 bimatrix game that has two Nash equilibria. One equilibrium is an evolutionary stable state, or ESS; the other is an equilibrium
in dominated strategies. Our primary experimental result is the observation that the ESS becomes extremely attractive when
subjects have minimal information about the payoff functions, although the dominated equilibrium assures the highest equilibrium
payoff. The attractiveness of the ESS is only moderate when players are completely informed about the 33 payoff matrix.
Correspondence to: S.K. Berninghaus |
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Keywords: | : Evolutionary games – ESS – Incomplete information – Experiment in continuous time |
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