COMPETITION IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS: CHARTER SCHOOL ENTRY,STUDENT SORTING,AND SCHOOL INPUT DETERMINATION |
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| Authors: | Nirav Mehta |
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| Affiliation: | University of Western Ontario, CanadaThe data were provided by North Carolina Education Research Data Center. I thank Kenneth Wolpin, Hanming Fang, and Elena Krasnokutskaya for their guidance, and the editor for many useful suggestions. I have greatly benefited from discussions with Andrew Clausen, Tim Conley, Chao Fu, Eleanor Harvill, Lance Lochner, Rachel Margolis, Salvador Navarro, Seth Richards‐Shubik, Shalini Roy, David Russo, Panos Stavrinides, Todd Stinebrickner, Petra Todd, and the participants in the Penn Empirical Micro lunch group and seminar. This research was supported by the Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, through Grant R305C050041‐05 to the University of Pennsylvania and the SSHRC Insight Development Grant Program. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of the U.S. Department of Education or SSHRC. Please address correspondence to: Nirav Mehta, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada. E‐mail: . |
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| Abstract: | This article develops and estimates an equilibrium model of charter school entry, school input choices, and student school choices. The structural model renders a comprehensive and internally consistent picture of treatment effects when there may be general equilibrium effects of school competition. Simulations indicate that the mean effect of charter schools on attendant students is positive and varies widely across locations. The mean spillover effect on public school students is small but positive. Lifting caps on charter schools would more than double entry but reduce gains for attendant students. |
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