IMPERFECTLY INFORMED VOTERS AND STRATEGIC EXTREMISM |
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| Authors: | Enriqueta Aragonès Dimitrios Xefteris |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica‐CSIC and Barcelona GSE, Spain;2. University of Cyprus, CyprusWe are grateful to three referees and the associate editor, Hülya Eraslan, for their constructive comments and suggestions. Aragonès acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya Grant number 2014 SGR 1064, the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science ECO2012‐37857, and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. For valuable feedback, we thank Tom Palfrey, David Austen‐Smith, Torun Dewan, Francesco Squintani, Gilat Levy, Socorro Puy, Ana McDowall, Jan Zapal, seminar audiences at London School of Economics, University of Mannheim, New York University Abu Dhabi, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, University of Warwick, and workshop and conference participants in Priorat, Rotterdam, Konstanz, Alghero, Lancaster, Girona, Toulouse, Santander, Angra, Barcelona, Edinburgh, Bilbao, and Thessaloniki. |
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| Abstract: | We analyze a two‐candidate Downsian model considering that voters use shortcuts (e.g., interest‐group/media endorsements) to infer candidates' policy platforms. That is, voters do not observe candidates' exact platforms but only which candidate offers the more leftist/rightist platform (relative positions). In equilibrium, candidates' behavior tends to maximum extremism, but it may converge or diverge depending on how voters behave when indifferent policywise between the candidates. When the tie‐breaking rule used by the voters is sufficiently fair, candidates converge to the extreme preferred by the median voter, but when it strongly favors a certain candidate, each candidate specializes in a different extreme. |
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