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An experimental study of signaling in auctions with a flexible reserve price

Institution:	1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China;2. Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands;1. Université Paris-Dauphine, DRM Finance, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France;2. Bilkent University Faculty of Business Administration, 06533 Ankara, Turkey;1. School of Economic Mathematics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, PR China;2. School of Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, PR China;3. Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5;1. Department of Economics, Waikato University, New Zealand;2. Facultad de Economía, Universidad del Rosario, Colombia;3. Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, Greece

Abstract:	This paper presents the results of an experimental study of preemptive jump bidding in English auctions with a flexible reserve price. While one of the possible explanations for jump bidding is based on signaling arguments, the ability of the seller to adjust his decision to accept an offer based on the bidding history makes the existence of a signaling equilibrium questionable. This paper shows that the seller's ability to set the reserve price after observing the opening bid reduces both jump bidding behavior and the use and interpretation of opening bids as a signaling device.

Keywords:	Takeover auction Preemptive bidding Jump bidding Signaling
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