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就业选择机制的博弈分析
引用本文:纪明. 就业选择机制的博弈分析[J]. 技术经济与管理研究, 2009, 0(5): 11-14
作者姓名:纪明
作者单位:吉林大学经济学院,吉林,长春,130012
摘    要:就业问题是经济领域的中心问题。在现实社会中,我国的就业选择机制存在着很大的缺陷。本文通过就业选择机制的博弈模型的建立,证明在完全信息时,显示偏好博弈只有唯一的纳什均衡结果,并且其均衡结果是帕累托有效和公平的。最后针对当前全球性金融危机为背景的经济形势和中国所面临的就业问题压力,对中国的现状进行了分析,并根据模型对就业选择机制的应用,以及如何有效解决中国的就业问题提出了一些建议。

关 键 词:就业选择机制  显示偏好  帕累托最优  博弈分析

Game Theory Analysis on Employment Selection Mechanism
JI Ming. Game Theory Analysis on Employment Selection Mechanism[J]. Technoeconomics & Management Research, 2009, 0(5): 11-14
Authors:JI Ming
Abstract:Employment is the central issue in the economic field. In reality, The current employment selection mechanism carries a handful of drawbacks in China. Through establishing the model of game, this paper proves that when the information is complete, Nash Equilibrium outcome is unique, and the outcome is Pareto efficient and fair. Finally, on analyzing the economic situation of the current global financial crisis and the great employment pressure in China, we should like to put forward some suggestions on the application of employment selection mechanism and how to solve the problem of employment effectively in China.
Keywords:Employment selection mechanism  Pareto optimality  Revealing preference  Game theory analysis
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