跨国公司股权进入模式的博弈分析

本文从股权和控制权分离的视角对跨国公司股权进入模式进行了动态的博弈分析。跨国公司的股权进入模式,尤其是对控制权的配置,是在满足东道国企业和跨国公司双方激励相容和参与约束的条件下,由双方共同决定的一种相机性配置机制,目的在于尽可能减少当地企业实施机会主义行为的风险,同时又能适时地给予当地合作者以足够的激励,以尽可能地利用当地资源。

A Game Analysis of MNE''''s Equity Entry Mode

From the point of the separation between stock right and control right, this paper sets up a game model to explore the cause of the choice of MNE's equity entry mode. This paper points out that the equity entry mode, especially the allocation of control rights, is decided when both sides' incentive compatibility constraints and participation constraints are satisfied. Thus, MNE's equity entry mode is the kind of contingent allocation mechanism, and a result of utilizing MNE's and home countries' resources through both restraining and inspiriting home enterprises.