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Collusion in uniform-price auctions: experimental evidence and implication for treasury auctions |
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| Authors: | Goswami G; Noe TH; Rebello MJ |
| Institution: | 1 Fordham University 2 Georgia State University and Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, USA 3 Georgia State University, USA |
| Abstract: | We provide experimental evidence that nonbinding preplay communicationbetween bidders in auctions of shares facilitates the adoptionof equilibrium strategies: collusive strategies in uniform-priceauctions, and the unique equilibrium in undominated strategiesin discriminatory auctions. When communication between biddersis introduced, clearing prices and auctioneer profits in uniform-priceauctions fall below those observed in discriminatory auctions.This evidence suggests that uniform-price auctions of Treasurysecurities may result in lower revenues than the currently employeddiscriminatory procedure. |
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