| 不完全信息下跨国兼并模型分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 伍江. 不完全信息下跨国兼并模型分析[J]. 新疆财经, 2007, 0(4): 59-64 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 伍江 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 西南财经大学,工商管理学院,四川,成都,610072 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文主要通过对不完全信息跨国兼并模型的分析,发现如果没有政府干预,外国企业只要具有成本上的优势,跨国兼并的发生是不可避免的。其中不完全信息并不是市场实现兼并的障碍,而政府在维护、平衡市场兼并效率和社会福利的关系方面中扮演着重要角色。
|
| 关 键 词： | 兼并 古诺竞争 社会福利 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-8576（2007）04-0059-06 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-05-08 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-05-08 |
Analysis on Cross-Border Merger Model under Information Asymmetry |
| |
| Wu Jiang. Analysis on Cross-Border Merger Model under Information Asymmetry[J]. Finance & Economics of Xinjiang, 2007, 0(4): 59-64 |
| |
| Authors: | Wu Jiang |
| |
| Affiliation: | Southwestern University of Finance and Economics , Chengdu 610072, China |
| |
| Abstract: | In this paper we have investigated the cross-border mergers in a Cournot duopoly set up with asymmetric information.It is shown that cross-border merger will be evitable if a foreign enterprise has advantage of cost compared to a host enterprise.Asymmetric information alone does not become a hindrance of cross merger in a Cournot duopoly market and the Government can play an important role in mergers and antitrust policy. |
| |
| Keywords: | Merger Cournot Competition Social Welfare |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
