Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces |
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Authors: | Jörg Oechssler Frank Riedel |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24, 53113 Bonn, GERMANY (e-mail: oechssler@uni-bonn.de)
,DE;2.Department of Economics, Humboldt University, Spandauer Stra?e 1, 10178 Berlin, GERMANY (e-mail: riedel@wiwi.hu-berlin.de)
,DE |
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Abstract: | Summary. The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this
unsatisfying restriction is unnecessary. We specify a simple condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics
are well defined for the case of infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide new conditions for the stability of rest
points and show that even strict equilibria may be unstable. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications
like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, linear-quadratic games, the harvest preemption game, and games with mixed
strategies.
Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: January 31, 2000 |
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Keywords: | and Phrases:Replicator dynamics Evolutionary stability Continuous strategy spaces |
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