The trade-off between risk and incentives in fiscal federalism: Evidence from China |
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Institution: | China Financial Policy Research Center, School of Finance, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China |
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Abstract: | A central argument of the second-generation fiscal federalism literature is that allocating a considerable share of tax revenue to local governments can provide fiscal incentives for local officials to promote economic growth. However, increasing incentives will increase the costs of uncertainty if local government officials are risk averse. Building on the insights of the classic principal-agent models, we predict that the optimal share of tax revenues retained by local government will decrease as the uncertainty of total tax revenues increases. Using Chinese provincial data, we find a robust negative relationship between volatility and the tax-sharing ratio at the sub-provincial level. Our results indicate that optimal decentralization in developing countries balances the trade-off between risk and incentives. |
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