Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry |
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Authors: | Kenneth Hendricks Ilke Onur Thomas Wiseman |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI, 53706, USA 2. Center for Regulation and Market Analysis, School of Commerce, University of South Australia, GPO Box 2471, Adelaide, Australia 3. Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, 78712, USA
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Abstract: | Using a dataset of calculator auctions on eBay, we first show that last-minute bidding is not merely the result of bidders’
going to the next-to-close auction. Instead, bidding is concentrated at the end of the period in which the auction is the
next to close, suggesting the existence of strategic last-minute bidding. Then, we model repeated, ascending price auctions
for homogeneous goods with unobserved, stochastic entry. We show that the dynamic game has a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium
in which entrants always reveal themselves by bidding in the auction in which they arrive, and bidding occurs at the last
minute. |
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Keywords: | |
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