Mergers with future rivals can boost prices,bar entry,and intensify market concentration |
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| Institution: | 1. Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Catholic University of Milan, Via Necchi 5, 20123 Milano, Italy;2. Dipartimento di Matematica per le Scienze Economiche, Finanziarie ed Attuariali, Catholic University of Milan, Largo Gemelli 1, Milano 20123, Italy;1. Compass Lexecon, Spain;2. Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, CEPR and Compass Lexecon, Belgium;3. Bergamo University and Compass Lexecon, Italy;1. Office of Communications UK;2. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ed Aziendali “M. Fanno”, Università di Padova, Italy;3. School of Economics and Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, UK;1. Uber Technologies, Inc., USA;2. Department of Economics, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA;1. Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia and NOVASBE, Portugal;2. Harvard Law School, United States;3. Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Católica Porto Business School and CEGE, Portugal;4. Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia and CEF.UP, Portugal; Compass Lexecon, Spain |
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| Abstract: | It is theoretically shown that mergers between incumbents and future rivals can boost prices and harm consumers. But in the absence of empirical evidence, no merger has been litigated on this basis. To offer empirical insights, I study the acquisition case of a promising future rival by a large incumbent pharmaceutical firm. First, there is strong and causal evidence that the merger has enabled higher prices for the incumbent. Mergers with future rivals are practically unregulated and, if wisely exploited, they can circumvent antitrust enforcement and serve as entry barriers. Second, in contrast to the mainstream prediction that mergers with future rivals do not alter market concentration, I report a large post-merger increase in the market concentration. I introduce advertisement expenditure as a possible channel of effect between the merger and market concentration. Third, I document spillover effect of the merger on the incumbent's immediate rivals without affecting its distant rivals. |
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