Policy orientations and technology choices in standards wars |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Management, Fudan University, 670 Guoshun Road, Shanghai 200433, China;2. Department of Economics, University of Southern California, 3620 South Vermont Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90089, United States;3. Uber Technologies Inc., United States;1. Managing Economist, Bates White Economic Consulting, 2001 K Street NW, North Building, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20036, United States;2. Yale University and NBER, 195 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06511, United States;1. Ohio State University, 1945 N High St, Columbus, OH 43210, USA;2. State University of New York (SUNY) at Albany, Hudson 257A, Albany, New York, 12222, USA;1. Toulouse School of Economics: 1, Esplanade de l''Université, Toulouse, 31080, France;2. Università di Bergamo: 2, via dei Caniana, Bergamo, 24127, Italy;3. Luiss: 32, Viale Romania, Roma, 00197, Italy;1. Oslo Business School, Oslo Metropolitan University, Norway;2. Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Norway;1. Compass Lexecon, Spain;2. Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, CEPR and Compass Lexecon, Belgium;3. Bergamo University and Compass Lexecon, Italy |
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| Abstract: | Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) exhibit a variety of policy orientations toward the conflicting interests of technology developers and adopters. In this paper, we analyze a model that incorporates the technology choices of SSOs in standards wars and royalty determinations made by the developers of essential technologies. We show that both policy orientations toward developers relative to adopters and coordinated standard setting by SSOs that issue competing standards may result in a more-than-optimal number of essential technologies. Furthermore, we examine how SSOs’ technology choices may be affected by both network effects in standard adoption and coalition formation among developers. |
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