Letting third parties who suffer from petty corruption talk: Evidence from a collusive bribery experiment |
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| Institution: | 1. London School of Economics and, Political Science (LSE), Houghton Street, WC2A 2AE, London, England, UK;2. Research Institute of Industrial, Economics (IFN), Box 55665, 102 15, Stockholm, Sweden;1. The Bank of Russia, Russia;2. HSE University, Russia;1. Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Via Enrico Fermi 2749, 21027, Ispra, Italy;2. University of Bremen, Faculty of Business Studies and Economics, Germany;3. CAPP – Research Centre for the Analysis of Public Policies, Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Italy |
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| Abstract: | Following a recommendation by Transparency International, we conduct a laboratory experiment to gauge the impact of a specific type of grassroots participation on petty corruption. Participants play a one-shot, three-person sequential bribery game that, depending on the treatment, either gives or does not give passive third parties suffering from corruption the opportunity to send a publicly visible message to potential bribers and bribees. We find that messaging opportunities deter bribe offers (i.e., the extensive margin of bribe), but affect neither the size of the offered bribe (i.e., the intensive margin) nor bribe acceptances. We conjecture that the different impact of the treatment on bribe-givers and bribe-takers may be due to the order of play. |
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| Keywords: | Petty corruption Bribery game Communication Experiments |
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