Private Rentenversicherung, Besteuerung und adverse Selektion |
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Authors: | Dirk Kiesewetter Michael Thaut |
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Institution: | 1. Tübingen
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Abstract: | Adverse selection is commonly regarded as an important explanation for the limited size of voluntary annuity markets. Annuitants tend to be longer-lived than the population at large, thus making annuities too expensive for average individuals. Because German tax law discrimates between annuities and other forms of investment, privileged taxation of annuities might compensate for the cost of adverse selection. A major change in the taxation of annuities has been passed recently: From 2005 on, premium payments for deferred life annuities will be tax-deductible and annuities paid out will be fully taxable, if the annuitant cannot opt for an endowment. Premiums for other contracts are not tax-deductible and annuities are partly taxable. Unlike today, endowment payments won’t be tax free, anymore. We evaluate the cost of theoretical, fairly priced contracts for annuitants and non-annuitants using the money’s worth ratio. Therefore, the money’s worth concept is extended to the case of deferred annuities. Our calculations suggest that, under current legislation, average individuals have no incentive to annuitize. In contrast, under new legislation, the tax advantage of the deferred annuity without endowment option more than compensates for the cost of adverse selection. Single premium annuities will remain too expensive for average men, but may become advantageous for average women in some cases. |
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