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理货行业串谋现象博弈分析与防范研究
引用本文:何凌权.理货行业串谋现象博弈分析与防范研究[J].物流科技,2005,28(11):73-76.
作者姓名:何凌权
作者单位:复旦大学,上海,200433
摘    要:当前理货体制改革进展缓慢,举步维艰,究其原因主要是因为理货服务中存在着串谋,致使理货服务的根本性原则--公正性得不到贯彻.本文从博弈的角度出发,利用决策分析手段,建立简单的博弈模型,在模型上求解,并对解进行了讨论分析,给出了串谋发生的一些基本条件,在此基础上提出了防范串谋的措施.

关 键 词:理货  串谋  博弈分析
文章编号:1002-3100(2005)11-0073-04
收稿时间:2005-05-19
修稿时间:2005年5月19日

Game Analysis and Countermeasure Research on Collusion Problem in Tally Industry
HE Ling-quan.Game Analysis and Countermeasure Research on Collusion Problem in Tally Industry[J].Logistics Management,2005,28(11):73-76.
Authors:HE Ling-quan
Institution:Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China
Abstract:Collusion in tally industry,which blocks the fundamental principle of tally service-justice to be carried out,has been the serious hurdle to obstruct the reform in tally industry.This paper takes advantage of the decision analysis method to cstablish a simple model from the game angle,and then solves the model,discusses and analyses the solution.Finally,some hasic conditions about collusion happened are given,some measurements which make corruption impossible are put forward.
Keywords:tally  collusion  game analysis
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