Could do better: The effectiveness of incentives and competition in schools |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, United Kingdom;2. Department of Economics, University of Cantabria, Avda. Los Castros s/n, 39005, Santander, Cantabria, Spain;1. Department of Biomedical Science and BK21 PLUS Center for Creative Biomedical Scientists at Chonnam National University, Chonnam National University Medical School, Gwangju 501-746, South Korea;2. Department of Agricultural Biotechnology and Research Institute for Agriculture and Life Sciences, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-921, South Korea;3. Brigham and Women''s Hospital & Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02115, USA;1. Laboratório de Biotecnologia Marinha–BioMar-Lab, Departamento de Engenharia de Pesca, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Campus do Pici s/n, bloco 871, 60440-970 Fortaleza, CE, Brazil;2. Instituto de Ciências do Mar–Labomar, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Av. da Abolição, 3207, 60165-081 Fortaleza, CE, Brazil;3. Departamento de Biologia Molecular, Universidade Federal da Paraíba, João Pessoa, PB, Brazil;4. Laboratório de Moléculas Biologicamente Ativas—BioMol-Lab, Departamento de Bioquímica e Biologia Molecular, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Campus do Pici, s/n bloco 907, 60440-970 Fortaleza, CE, Brazil;1. Department of Bio-Sciences, Integral University, Lucknow, 226026, India;2. Department of Bio-Engineering, Integral University, Lucknow, 226026, India;1. Department of Biotechnology & Microbiology and Inter-University Centre for Bioscience, Kannur University, Thalassery Campus, Palayad, Kerala 670 661, India;2. Molecular Biophysics Unit, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560 012, India;1. Centre for Interdisciplinary Research in Basic Sciences, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, 110025, India;2. Immunochemistry Lab, National Institute of Immunology, Aruna Asaf Ali Marg, New Delhi, 110067, India |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effects of incentive mechanisms and of the competitive environment on the interaction between schools and students, in a set-up where the students' educational attainment depends on their peer group, on their effort, and on the quality of the school's teaching. We show that increasing the power of the incentive scheme and the effectiveness of competition may have the counterintuitive effect of lowering the students' effort. In a simple dynamic set-up, where the reputation of the schools affects recruitment, we show that more powerful incentives and increased competition lead to segregation of pupils by ability, and may also determine lower attainment in some schools. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
