Testing,crime and punishment |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Case Western Reserve University, United States;2. University of California-Santa Barbara, NBER, United States;1. University of Missouri-St. Louis, Department of Psychological Sciences, 1 University Blvd., Stadler Hall 442A, St. Louis, MO 63121, USA;2. Neuroscience Research Australia, Barker Street Randwick, Sydney, NSW 2031, Australia;3. School of Medical Sciences, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia;4. Brown University, Department of Biostatistics and Center for Statistical Sciences, Providence, RI 02912, USA;5. Brown University, Computer Science Department, Providence, RI 02912, USA;6. Washington University School of Medicine, Mallinckrodt Institute of Radiology, 510 S. Kingshighway, St. Louis, MO 63110, USA;7. Missouri Institute of Mental Health,4633 World Parkway Circle, Berkeley, MO 63134-3115, USA;8. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, 1211 Medical Center Drive, Nashville, TN 37232, USA;1. Health Organisation, Policy and Economics (HOPE) group, Centre for Primary Care & Health Services Research, The University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, United Kingdom;2. Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7JP, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | The recent passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 solidified a national trend toward increased student testing for the purpose of evaluating public schools. This new environment for schools provides strong incentives for schools to alter the ways in which they deliver educational services. This paper investigates whether schools may employ discipline for misbehavior as a tool to bolster aggregate test performance. To do so, this paper utilizes an extraordinary data set constructed from the school district administrative records of a subset of the school districts in Florida during the 4 years surrounding the introduction of a high-stakes testing regime.It compares the suspensions of students involved in each of the 41,803 incidents in which two students were suspended and where prior test scores for both students are observed. While schools always tend to assign harsher punishments to low-performing students than to high-performing students throughout the year, this gap grows substantially during the testing window.Moreover, this testing window-related gap is only observed for students in testing grades. In summary, schools apparently act on the incentive to re-shape the testing pool through selective discipline in response to accountability pressures. |
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