Context matters to explain field experiments: Results from Colombian and Thai fishing villages |
| |
Authors: | Daniel Castillo François BousquetMarco A Janssen Kobchai WorrapimphongJuan Camillo Cardenas |
| |
Institution: | a Institutions and Rural Development Research Group, School of Environmental and Rural Studies, Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombiab UPRGREEN, CIRAD. Campus international de Baillarguet - TA C-47 / F - 34398 Montpellier Cedex 5, Francec Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, United Statesd Department of Biology, Faculty of Science, Chulalongkorn University, Pathumwan Bangkok 10330, Thailande Department of Economics, Universidad de los Andes, Calle 19A No. 1-37 Este Bloque W Bogotá, Colombia |
| |
Abstract: | During the last decade, field experiments regarding the study of common pool resource governance have been performed that replicated earlier findings of laboratory experiments. One of the questions is how the decisions made by participants in rural communities are influenced by their experience. This paper presents the results of field experiments in Colombia and Thailand on fishery resources. Context information is derived from the communities via in-depth interviews, surveys and role playing exercises. The use of different methodological tools allowed to link decisions in field experiments with contextual variables for two fishery villages. Explanation of core variables in social dilemmas is given, the degree of cooperation levels, preferred rules, rule compliance and enforcement. Main findings include: i) fishermen made decisions in the field experiments that reflected their own experience and context, ii) agreements for rule crafting are possible only under specific conditions that guarantees livelihoods and sustainability, iii) the broader context determines cooperation levels at a local level, iv) inequalities in the sanctioning of rule breakers decrease the possibilities of reaching cooperation agreements, and v) high levels of trust among local fishermen is not a sufficient condition for resource sustainability, when trust in external rule makers and enforcers is low. |
| |
Keywords: | Field experiments Role games Fisheries Rules Cooperation Trust |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|