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Local interaction in tax evasion
Authors:Barnabás M Garay  András Simonovits  János Tóth
Institution:
  • a Faculty of Information Technology, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Práter utca 50/A, Budapest, H-1083, Hungary
  • b Computer and Automation Institute (SZTAKI), Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Kende u. 13-17, Budapest, H-1111, Hungary
  • c Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budaörsi út 45, Budapest, H-1112, Hungary
  • d Department of Economics, Central European University, Nádor u. 9., Budapest, H-1051, Hungary
  • e Department of Differential Equations, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, M?egyetem rakpart 3-9, Budapest, H-1111, Hungary
  • f Department of Analysis, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, M?egyetem rakpart 3-9, Budapest, H-1111, Hungary
  • Abstract:When individuals underreport their incomes, they take into account their private gains and moral losses, the latter depending on the acquaintances’ previous underreports. We prove that under quite natural assumptions the process globally converges to the symmetric steady state.
    Keywords:C62  H26
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