An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases |
| |
| Authors: | Uwe KratzschGernot Sieg Ulrike Stegemann |
| |
| Affiliation: | TU Braunschweig, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Spielmannstr. 9, 38106 Braunschweig, Germany |
| |
| Abstract: | Greenhouse gas emissions build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. We identify weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria with full participation in a game of international emission reduction. Treaties are easier to reach for long-lived than for short-lived gases. |
| |
| Keywords: | Q54 F53 H41 |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
