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Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another

Authors:	Sandro Shelegia Yossi Spiegel

Affiliation:	^a Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Austria ^b Recanati Graduate School of Business Adminstration, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978, Israel ^c CEPR, United Kingdom ^d Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim, Germany

Abstract:	We show that the Bertrand oligopoly model with cost asymmetries may admit multiple Nash equilibria when firms hold passive ownership stakes in each other. The equilibrium price may be as high as the monopoly price of the most efficient firm.

Keywords:	D43 L41
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