员工工资、培训与跳槽:一个劳工合约模型

本文通过劳工合约模型论证了员工工资与企业培训之间的交替关系，并分析了企业向接受培训继而跳槽的员工收取罚金对该交替关系的影响。在跳槽率作为外生变量时．若企业不向跳槽的员工收取罚金．签约员工通常乐于以较低的工资换取更多的技能培训。鉴于此，为使劳动力流动更有利于提高生产力和降低通货膨胀，政府应采取培训导向型的收入政策．或通过货币政策和财政政策的传导，鼓励企业和雇主增加培训支出并取消跳槽罚金。

Wages, Training, and Quitting: A Labor-Contract Model

This paper shows the substitution between wages and training, through a labor-contract model, and the effect on this relation, if incorporating training-related quit penalty into the contract. If the quit rate is exogenous and the quit penalty associated with training is absent, the contracted employees would like to accept lower wages in order to gain more training. Therefore, to make labor exchange more productive and less inflationary, the government should adopt training-oriented incomes policies or those monetary and fiscal policies conductive to an increase in training and discourage the quit penalty that tie in with training.