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基于博弈视角的三阶段流域水量冲突协调分配研究
引用本文:陈军飞,裴金鹏. 基于博弈视角的三阶段流域水量冲突协调分配研究[J]. 水利经济, 2019, 37(1): 49-53
作者姓名:陈军飞  裴金鹏
作者单位:河海大学商学院;河海大学水文水资源与水利工程科学国家重点实验室
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(41877526,71433003);江苏省水利科技项目(2017060);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(18YJA630009);国家重点研发计划(2017YFC0404600)
摘    要:针对流域水量冲突问题,基于博弈视角建立了三阶段流域水量协调分配博弈模型,并以常德市澧水流域为例进行案例分析,对流域水量冲突管理过程进行了研究。研究结果表明:阶段一是基于个体理性的顺序博弈,处于上游的地区具有取水优势,而下游用水主体则可能不能满足其基本的用水需求,易引发冲突;阶段二引入政府调控,其节水水平有了很大的提高,且能保障各地区的基本用水需求,但由于信息不对称,很难达到均衡状态;阶段三实现了政府与市场相结合,通过调整市场水权交易价格和水资源税率对流域水量冲突进行协调分配。

关 键 词:博弈;水量冲突;协调分配;澧水流域
收稿时间:2018-10-09

Three-stage coordinated allocation for basin water conflicts based on game theory
CHEN Junfei and PEI Jinpeng. Three-stage coordinated allocation for basin water conflicts based on game theory[J]. Journal of Economics of Water Resources, 2019, 37(1): 49-53
Authors:CHEN Junfei and PEI Jinpeng
Affiliation:Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China;State Key Laboratory of Hydrology-Water Resources and Hydraulic Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China and Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China
Abstract:A three-stage coordinated allocation model based on the game theory is established to solve the problem of water conflicts in river basins. A case study of Lishui River basin in Changde City, China is carried out to study the process of water conflict management. The results show that the first stage is based on the sequent game of individual rationality, the upstream region has the advantage of water intake, while the downstream water users may not meet their basic water demand, easily leading to conflicts. At the second stage, by introducing the governmental regulation and control, the water-saving level is greatly improved, and the basic water demand of various regions can be ensured. However, because of the information asymmetry, it is difficult to achieve the equilibrium state. At the third stage, the government and the market are combined to coordinate the allocation of water resource conflicts in the river basin by adjusting the price of water right transaction and the tax rate of water resources.
Keywords:game theory   water conflict   coordinated allocation   Lishui River basin
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