Multilateral Bargaining Problems |
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Authors: | Elaine Bennett |
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Affiliation: | Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia, 24061;University of California, Los Angeles, California, 90024 |
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Abstract: | In many situations in economics and political science there are gains from forming coalitions but conflict over which coalition to form and how to distribute the gains. This paper presents an approach to suchmultilateral bargaining problems. Asolutionto a multilateral bargaining problem specifies an agreement for each coalition that is consistent with the bargaining process in every coalition. We establish the existence of such solutions, show that they are determined by reservation prices, and characterize these reservation prices as the payoffs ofsubgame perfect equilibrium outcomesof a non-cooperative bargaining model.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72, C78. |
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