The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Université de Toulouse, (IDEI, GREMAQ, ARQADE), 1 Place Anatole, Toulouse Cedex 31042, France;2. University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA;3. Université de Toulouse, (IDEI, GREMAQ), France;4. Institut Universitaire de France, France;1. Division of Epidemiology and Prevention, Aichi Cancer Center Research Institute, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan;2. Department of Hematology, Toyota Kosei Hospital, Toyota, Japan;3. Department of Haematology and Cell Therapy, Aichi Cancer Center Hospital, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan;4. Division of Molecular Medicine, Aichi Cancer Center Research Institute, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan;5. Division of Virology, National Cancer Center Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan;6. Department of Clinical Laboratories, Aichi Cancer Center Hospital, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan;1. Section of Hematology/Oncology, Department of Internal Medicine, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia, USA;2. Department of Pharmacy, West Virginia University, Morgantown, and West Virginia Osborn Hematopoietic Malignancy and Transplantation Program, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia, USA;3. Department of Biostatistics, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia, USA;4. Osborn Hematopoietic Malignancy and Transplantation Program, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia, USA;5. Division of Hematology-Oncology, Medical College of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA;1. Department of Cardiothoracic Surgery, University Hospital of Cologne, Cologne, Germany;2. Department of Cardiothoracic Surgery, Transplantation and Mechanical Circulatory Support, Royal Brompton & Harefield NHS Foundation Trust, Harefield Hospital, Harefield, United Kingdom;1. Emma Children''s Hospital, Academic Medical Center (AMC), University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;2. Department of Immunopathology, Sanquin Research and Landsteiner Laboratory, AMC, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;3. Department of Blood Cell Research, Sanquin Research and Landsteiner Laboratory, AMC, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;1. Department of Gastrointestinal Oncology, Royal Marsden Hospital, Sutton, UK;2. Department of Gastrointestinal Oncology, Royal Marsden Hospital, Sutton, UK;3. Royal Marsden Hospital, Sutton, UK;4. Royal Marsden Hospital, Sutton, UK;5. Heartlands Hospital, Bordesley Green East, Birmingham, UK;6. Department of Gastrointestinal Oncology, Royal Marsden Hospital, Sutton, UK;7. Department of Gastrointestinal Oncology, Royal Marsden Hospital, Sutton, UK;1. Division of Radiation Oncology, Institute of Biomedical Research and Innovation, Kobe, Japan;2. Division of Integrated Oncology, Institute of Biomedical Research and Innovation, Kobe, Japan;3. Department of Radiation Oncology and Image-Applied Therapy, Kyoto University Graduate School of Medicine, Kyoto, Japan |
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| Abstract: | We analyze the design of incentive mechanisms for the provision of transnational public goods under asymmetric information. Transnational public goods are infrastructures that no single country can afford to build for itself. We show that the external constraints imposed by this mechanism may affect consumption, pricing and the true redistributive concerns of local governments. We characterize the corresponding distortions. We also discuss the impact of the preferences for redistribution of the international agency in charge of designing the mechanism and the role of its ability to enforce that mechanism. |
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