The effect of seasonal variations in auditor workload on local government audit fees and audit delay

Prior studies of government audit fees and audit delay (elapsed time from fiscal year end (FYE) to date of the audit report) employ a dichotomous variable to control for seasonality. However, a single variable does not appear to fully capture the effects of seasonality on audit fees or audit delay in the US local government sector. We compare the effects of FYEs commonly observed by US local governments (i.e., June 30, September 30, and December 31) on the audit fees and audit delay of 302 cities and counties for fiscal 1993. Our findings indicate that governments with June FYEs incur lower fees than do governments with either September or December FYEs. We also find that June and December governments sustain equivalent (and maximal) audit delay, and that September governments experience minimal delay. The results show that, in terms of fees and delay, December 31 is the least desirable of the FYE dates commonly found in the US local government arena. Our findings further suggest that audit fees may influence audit delay, when considered in a seasonal context.