Regulatory learning in failed thrift auctions |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Centre for Financial and Corporate Integrity, Faculty of Business and Law, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry CV1 5FB, United Kingdom;2. Newcastle University Business School, 5 Barrack Road, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 4SE, United Kingdom;3. University of Liverpool Management School, Chatham Building, Chatham Street, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZH, United Kingdom;1. Graduate School of Business Administration, Fordham University, Room 1319, 1790 Broadway, New York, NY 10023, United Statesn;2. Department of Finance, National Chung Hsing University, 250 Kuo-Kuang Road, Taichung 402, Taiwan, ROCn;1. Marine Bioproducts Engineering Group, Dalian Institute of Chemical Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Dalian, Liaoning 116023, China;2. Institute of Vegetable and Flower Research, Chongqing Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Chongqing 401329, China |
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| Abstract: | We use a sample of failed thrift auctions to examine if regulators learn from early transactions and improve their performance in later transactions. Our findings suggest that experience at failure resolution does not by itself lead to improved regulatory performance. Evidence of regulatory learning is restricted to dealings with repeat acquirers; in cases where an acquiring firm makes abnormal gains, regulators are able to restructure the auction process and eliminate such gains in subsequent acquisitions made by the same acquirers. |
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