风险投资家的逆向选择、道德风险及契约设计

风险投资的高风险性加剧了由于信息不对称所引发的代理问题,加之市场上高能力的风险投资家的稀缺性,导致主要代理问题——逆向选择和道德风险的解决不可能是同步的。信号甄别模型发现,高风险性一方面对风险投资家的能力提出了更高的要求,另一方面,即使是高能力的风险投资家也会要求较高的固定收益,因而高风险应该成为研究风险投资的主线。激励机制模型则演绎了风险投资家的资金注入量与利润分享系数之间的理论联系。

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard of Venture Capitalist as Agent and the Design of Financing Contract

High risk of VC worsens the agent problem,which is brought about by asymmetric information.The absence of venture capitalist with high ability make the main agent problem,that is adverse selection and moral hazard,not to be settled simultaneously.The main finding in signal screening model is that,on the one hand,high risk demands the venture capitalist with higher ability,on the other hand,even if the venture capitalist with higher ability would demand higher fixed income.So in research of venture capital,it is important to regard high risk as key clue.Incentive systems model deducts the theoretic relation between the fund injection and profit sharing.