Institutional endowment as foundation for regulatory performance and regime transitions: the role of the US constitution in telecommunications regulation in the United States |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Biomedical Engineering, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA;2. Department of Mechanical Engineering, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA;3. Department of Urology, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA, USA.;4. Departmemt of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Penn State Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, Hershey, PA, USA;5. Departments of Pediatrics and Public Health Sciences, Penn State University College of Medicine, Hershey, PA, USA;6. GE Global Research, Niskayuna, NY, USA;7. Departments of Mechanical Engineering and Biomedical Engineering, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA;8. Department of Surgery, Penn State Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, Hershey, PA, USA |
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| Abstract: | Recent research demonstrates the importance of what Spiller and Levy (1994, 1996) call a nation's institutional endowment to the efficacy of regulatory policies. We examine various roles of the US Constitution as an enabler of regulatory governance institutions that shape policies towards telecommunications industries, and constrain efforts to change those policies. Constitutional clauses designed to serve important noneconomic societal goals do so by limiting the discretion and efficacy of government bodies. This limits the extent to which regulatory policies may be used to promote economic efficiency. However, these constitutional constraints may also promote long-term efficiency goals by making regulatory commitments more credible. |
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