Evolutionary Game Theory and the Modeling of Economic Behavior |
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Authors: | Gerard Van der Laan Xander Tieman |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Free University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | Since the 1950s economists have applied game-theoretical concepts to a wide variety of economic problems. The Nash equilibrium concept has proven to be a powerful instrument in analyzing the outcome of economic processes. Since the late 1980s economists have also shown a growing interest in the application of evolutionary game theory. This paper discusses the main concepts of evolutionary game theory and their applicability to economic issues. Whereas traditional game theory focusses on the static Nash equilibria as the possible outcomes of the game, evolutionary game theory teaches us to explicitly model the behavior of individuals outside equilibrium. This may provide us with a better understanding of the dynamic forces within a society of interacting individuals. |
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Keywords: | noncooperative symmetric bimatrix game evolutionary stable strategy replicator dynamics learning and imitation metastrategy stable population |
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