Learning and transfer in signaling games |
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Authors: | David J Cooper John H Kagel |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 10900 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44106-7206, USA;(2) Department of Economics, 410 Arps Hall, Ohio State University, 1945 North High Street, Columbus, OH 43210-1172, USA |
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Abstract: | We explore how learning to play strategically in one signaling game promotes strategic play in a related signaling game. Following
convergence to a pooling equilibrium, payoffs are changed to only support separating equilibria. More strategic play is observed
following the change in payoffs than for inexperienced subjects in control sessions, contrary to the prediction of a fictitious
play learning model. Introducing a growing proportion of sophisticated learners, subjects who anticipate responders’ behavior
following the change in payoffs, enables the model to capture the positive cross-game learning observed in the data.
Research support form the National Science Foundation grant number SBR9809538 is gratefully acknowledged. We have received
research support from Jo Ducey, Guillaume Frechette, Steve Lehrer, and Carol Kraker Stockman. We have benefitted from comments
of Eric Bettinger, John Ham, Jim Rebeitzer, Bob Slonim and seminar participants at Case Western Reserve University, Ohio State
University, the University of Mississippi, the University of Illinois, and Purdue University. The usual caveat applies. |
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Keywords: | Learning Learning transfer Cross-game learning Signaling games Experiment |
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