| 大股东治理机制背景的独立董事功用 |
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| 引用本文： | 杜育华. 大股东治理机制背景的独立董事功用[J]. 改革, 2010, 0(3) |
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| 作者姓名： | 杜育华 |
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| 作者单位： | 华中科技大学博士后流动站; |
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| 基金项目： | 湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目“我国国家财产权制度与公司治理结构变革路径研究”(批准号:2008q164) |
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| 摘 要： | 独立化后的独立董事会削弱大股东治理机制的有效性,其本身也难以发挥监督经理层、保护股东利益的作用,从而可能诱发股东与经理层之间的利益冲突,损害股东整体利益。基于我国上市公司存在双重委托代理问题及投资者法律保护较弱的现实情况,构建具有中国特色的公司治理结构应从两方面着手:政府选择合适的国家终极产权控制方式和合理的代理人行使国有股股权优化大股东治理;制定和切实实行保护小股东的外部强制规则。
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| 关 键 词： | 双重委托代理问题 独立董事 独立性 大股东治理 股东整体利益(价值) |
The Analyses of Independent Directors' Governance Effects Based on the View of Double Principal-agent |
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| Du Yuhua. The Analyses of Independent Directors' Governance Effects Based on the View of Double Principal-agent[J]. Reform, 2010, 0(3) |
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| Authors: | Du Yuhua |
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| Abstract: | The independence of independent directors must be reinforced in order to curb large shareholder and provide better protection to small shareholders.The paper studies how the independence reformation of independent directors would have an influence on agency cost between shareholders and managers based on the theory of double principal-agent.That is independent directors after reforming will impair governance effectiveness of large shareholder,and they also can't monitor managers and protect shareholders.As ... |
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| Keywords: | double principal-agent problem independent directors independence governance of large shareholder the whole shareholders profits(value) |
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