| 地票交易中各利益主体博弈的经济学分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 谭新龙.地票交易中各利益主体博弈的经济学分析[J].改革与战略,2010,26(3):91-93,141. |
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| 作者姓名： | 谭新龙 |
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| 作者单位： | 华中科技大学经济学院,湖北,武汉,430074 |
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| 摘 要： | 重庆农村土地交易所开展的地票交易开创了城乡土地流转的新路径。其中，农村宅基地使用权地票交易，实现了复垦农民、政府和开发商三方利益主体的怕累托改进，但忽略了被征地农民的利益。文章试图从经济学角度分析地票交易中各利益主体之间的博弈及利益分配。以发现地票交易制度设计中的缺陷，并提出合理的改进制度设计的建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 地票交易 利益主体 博弈 制度设计 |
An Economic Analysis of the Game Between Each Beneficiary in Land Ticket Trade |
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| Tan Xinlong.An Economic Analysis of the Game Between Each Beneficiary in Land Ticket Trade[J].Reformation & Strategy,2010,26(3):91-93,141. |
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| Authors: | Tan Xinlong |
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| Institution: | Tan Xinlong (School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science ＆ Technology, Wuhan, Hubei 430074) |
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| Abstract: | The land ticket trade developed by Chongqing rural land exchange pioneered a new path of the land circulation in urban and rural areas. Among them, the trade of country homestead use land ticket made farmers, government and developers which are main beneficiaries achieve Pareto improvement, but ignored the landless peasants＇ interests. This paper manages to make an economic analysis of the game and distribution of interests between main beneficiaries in land ticket trade in order to find some defects of land ticket trading system. It also presented some reasonable suggestions for improving the system design. |
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| Keywords: | land ticket trade beneficiaries game system design |
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