Resolution of incentive conflicts in the mortgage industry |
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Authors: | J. Harold Mulherin Walter J. Muller III |
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Affiliation: | (1) College of Commerce and Industry, Clemson University, USA;(2) College of Business Administration, University of Georgia, Georgia, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper analyzes the contractual response to incentive divergencies in the housing-finance sector of the economy. Emphasis is placed on the role played by the private mortgage insurance master policy in stemming the moral hazard of lenders. The structure of the coinsurance feature of the policy is shown to induce the lender to lessen foreclosure costs. Cases are identified where the inducements of coinsurance are not complete. This incompleteness explains the role of the time constraints and bidding instructions imposed on the lender by the master policy.The paper also considers the effects that securitization is having on the incentives of the players in housing finance. The decoupling of the lender from the investor role is lessening the effectiveness of coinsurance, thereby creating new agency costs. Responses such as increased explicit monitoring and the use of reputational bonding are noted and the expected future direction of the contractual structure is discussed. |
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