经理、内部董事与公司财务风险外部化——基于管家理论的视角

经理人内部控制很可能使公司财务风险外部化,造成财务风险的积聚,这是上市公司存在的一种被忽略的代理成本.基于管家理论对内部董事和财务风险的关系所进行的研究发现,公司的财务风险水平同内部董事比呈负相关,而董事长兼任总经理的公司的财务风险也相对较小.这说明,在对经理的监督约束机制相对乏力的情况下,内部董事缓解了由于经理的道德风险和逆向选择可能带给企业的财务风险,而管家理论也更适合解释内部董事的内部人控制问题.

Manager, Internal Director and Financial Risk Externalities of the Firm——The Perspective of the Stewardship Theory

Insider control by managers may well give rise to financial risk externalities of the firm and result in the accumulation of financial risks, which is an existing agency cost neglected in listed companies. A study of the relationship between internal director and financial risks based on the stewardship theory indicates that the level of financial risks is negatively correlated with the share of internal directors, and that a company whose chairman holds a concurrent position of general manager incurs low financial risks. This illustrates that with relatively weak supervision and constraining mechanism for managers, internal directors reduce financial risks brought by moral hazard and adverse selection, and that the stewardship theory can better explain insider control by internal directors.