Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility |
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Authors: | Günther G. Schulze Björn Frank |
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Affiliation: | 1.Universit?t Freiburg, Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung, Platz der Alten Synagoge 1, 79085 Freiburg, Germany,DE;2.German Institute for Economic Research, DIW, K?nigin-Luise-Str. 5, 14195 Berlin, Germany (e-mail: bfrank@diw.de),DE |
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Abstract: | This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a ‘payment satisfaction’ effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge. RID="*" ID="*" Acknowledgments: We are indebted to Johann Graf Lambsdorff for calling our attention to Fujimori's gender policy and to Ernst Fehr, Bruno Frey, Alireza Jay Naghavi, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. |
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Keywords: | : Corruption gender intrinsic motivation monitoring |
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