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Vertical and Horizontal Trust Networks in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Third Reich
Authors:Mixon  Franklin G.  Charles Sawyer  W.  Treviño  Len J.
Affiliation:(1) Department of Economics, The University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS, USA;(2) Department of Management and Operations, Washington State University, Pullman, WA, USA
Abstract:In a seminal contribution to the literature on bureaucracy, Breton and Wintrobe (The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organization. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1982) develop a model wherein subordinates and superiors in a bureaucratic structure ldquotraderdquo with each other to advance the objectives of the superiors. The success of such an organizational arrangement (for superiors) is based upon the development of ldquovertical trust networksrdquo in a way that facilitates the promise of ldquoinformal paymentsrdquo by superiors in return for ldquoinformal servicesrdquo provided by their subordinates. Breton and Wintrobe [Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986) 905] also provide a theoretical application of their model by describing the Nazi bureaucracy as a conglomeration of competing agencies that zealously carried out the ldquoFinal Solutionrdquo to the ldquoJewish question.rdquo As an extension, this note develops two compelling empirical examples of vertical and horizontal trust networks within the Nazi regime: Einsatzgruppen Arsquos (Special Action Detachments) attempt to liquidate all Lithuanian Jews after the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. in 1941 and the 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler.JEL Classification: D23, D73.
Keywords:bureaucracy theory  trust networks  economics of organization
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