| 电信企业基于价格行为的纵向市场圈定与接入规制 |
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| 引用本文： | 李美娟. 电信企业基于价格行为的纵向市场圈定与接入规制[J]. 经济评论, 2011, 0(2) |
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| 作者姓名： | 李美娟 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海财经大学国际工商管理学院;云南师范大学经济与管理学院; |
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| 摘 要： | 电信企业能否达到纵向市场圈定目的,与实施市场圈定的企业和被圈定企业在下游市场的成本差异有关。本文通过构建一个两阶段博弈模型,分析了电信企业基于价格行为的纵向市场圈定与接入规制问题。研究发现,当主导企业的下游附属企业具有成本优势时,则其通过实施价格策略性行为能够达到纵向市场圈定目的;当其处于成本劣势时,则不能通过价格行为实现纵向市场圈定。因此,规制机构在制定接入规制政策时,应根据下游市场两个企业的成本差异选择合理的接入规制方法。当新进入企业成本较低时,可采取有效成分接入定价法和由市场决定接入价格的两种接入规制方法;当两者成本相同时,可采取激励性接入规制方法;当新进入企业成本较高时,可对两者实行不对称接入规制。
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| 关 键 词： | 电信企业 纵向市场圈定 接入规制 |
Vertical Market Foreclosure Based on Price Behavior of Telecommunication Firms and Access Regulation |
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| Li Meijuan. Vertical Market Foreclosure Based on Price Behavior of Telecommunication Firms and Access Regulation[J]. Economic Review, 2011, 0(2) |
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| Authors: | Li Meijuan |
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| Affiliation: | Li Meijuan1,2(1:School of International Business Administration,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics2:School of Economics and Management,Yunnan Normal University) |
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| Abstract: | Whether the telecommunication firms can achieve vertical market foreclosure depends on the cost difference between implementing market foreclosure firms and foreclosed firms in the downstream market.By building a two-stage game model,this paper analyzes the problems of vertical market foreclosure based on price behaviors of telecommunication firms and access regulation.The study finds that the dominant firm's downstream subsidiary with cost advantage compared to the new entrants can achieve the purpose of v... |
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| Keywords: | Telecommunication Firms Vertical Market Foreclosure Access Regulation |
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