| 中国式分权下地方政府FDI税收竞争的策略性及其经济增长效应 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨晓丽,许垒. 中国式分权下地方政府FDI税收竞争的策略性及其经济增长效应[J]. 经济评论, 2011, 0(3) |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨晓丽 许垒 |
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| 作者单位： | 南开大学经济学院国际经济研究所;南开大学商学院; |
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| 摘 要： | 中国式分权机制下,政治和经济双重激励使地方政府竞相降低税率吸引FDI流入,本文考察了这种税收竞争的策略性及其对FDI经济增长效应的影响。模型表明地区间策略性税收竞争将通过降低外资质量影响FDI经济增长效应。使用1999-2006年省级面板数据进行实证分析,回归结果表明,经济发展水平相近的地区间外资企业实际所得税率具有显著的空间正相关性;税收优惠对FDI经济增长效应具有明显的阻碍作用;并且税收优惠幅度越大,阻碍作用越强。因此,我国需要加大对地方政府招商引资行为的监督和约束,以使地方政府放弃对FDI的盲目追捧,转而注重FDI质量,提高FDI对国民福利的促进作用。
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| 关 键 词： | 地方政府竞争 税收竞争策略 空间误差模型 经济增长 |
Intergovernmental Tax Competition on FDI under Chinese Decentralization and Its Influences on FDI's Economic Promotion Effects |
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| Yang Xiaoli , Xu Lei. Intergovernmental Tax Competition on FDI under Chinese Decentralization and Its Influences on FDI's Economic Promotion Effects[J]. Economic Review, 2011, 0(3) |
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| Authors: | Yang Xiaoli Xu Lei |
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| Affiliation: | Yang Xiaoli1 and Xu Lei2(1: Institute of International Economics,Nankai University,2: Business School,Nankai University) |
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| Abstract: | Under the Chinese-style decentralization mechanism,political and economic incentives make local governments compete to cut tax rates to attract FDI inflows,and this paper examines the strategic tax competition between local governments and how it affects the growth effect of FDI.Theoretical Model shows that there would be strategic tax competition between regions which will reduce the quality of foreign investment and thus affect economic growth effects of FDI.Using provincial panel data from 1999-2006,empi... |
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| Keywords: | Intergovernmental Tax Competition Strategic Tax Competition Spatial Error Model Economic Growth |
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