Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring |
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Authors: | Masaki Aoyagi |
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Affiliation: | (1) ISER, Osaka University, 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, 567-0047 Osaka, JAPAN |
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Abstract: | Summary. This paper studies repeated games with imperfect private monitoring when there exists a third-party mediator who coordinates play by giving non-binding instructions to players on which action to take and by collecting their private information. The paper presents a Nash-threat folk theorem for a communication equilibrium based on such mediation when monitoring is jointly -perfect in the sense that every player is almost perfectly monitored collectively by other players.JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82.I am very grateful to Mark Armstrong, V. Bhaskar, and Michihiro Kandori for helpful comments. Part of this research was conducted while I was visiting the University College London. Their hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. |
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Keywords: | Repeated games Private monitoring Joint monitoring Communication Mediation. |
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