国有控股、最高决策者激励与公司绩效

国内研究认为股权结构、董事会和高管激励对公司绩效有影响，而上市公司“国有一股独大”的国情使前两者不会有实质性作用；对于后者的研究则忽略了最高决策者在公司中的重要性。本文以1993—2002年数据为样本，研究国有股代理人(董事长和总经理)激励对公司绩效的影响。发现董事长是公司最高决策者，除政治激励能显著改善绩效外，最高决策者金钱激励、国有股权性质、两职合一、债权人治理等都和绩效没有显著关系；意味着只有将政治激励所附带的财富效用降低到一定程度，金钱激励才可能成为有效治理机制。

State Holding, Incentives of Uppermost Decision-maker and Firm Performance

From the existing study, ownership structure, board character and incentive of top-management have some effects on firm performance. But the fact is that listed firm is controlled by a single state-shareholder, which means ownership structure and board character can hardly affect performance. The research of incentive of top-management only constrains on the team of management, neglecting the importance of uppermost decision-maker's incentives. With the data from listing time to 2002 year, this paper studies the effect of incentives of controlling state-shareholder's core agents on performance. The result of this paper is that director is the listed firm's uppermost decision-maker, and that politic incentive can improve performance significantly, other factors as pecuniary incentive, nature of state-equity, one position or two, creditor governance all have no correlation with performance. The policy means of this result are that only when wealth utility going along with politic incentive descends to some level, pecuniary incentive can be one effective governance mechanism.