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股权分置改革均衡对价
引用本文:丁志国,苏治,杜晓宇.股权分置改革均衡对价[J].中国工业经济,2006(2):113-119.
作者姓名:丁志国  苏治  杜晓宇
作者单位:吉林大学数量经济研究中心,吉林,长春,130012
基金项目:国家哲学社会科学基金;教育部科学技术研究项目;中国科学院资助项目
摘    要:本文根据政策中性原则与套利分析理论推导出市场均衡条件下的股权分置改革对价公式,对46家试点公司和进入全面股改后推出的前两批72家公司对价方案进行剖析,认为部分上市公司对价支付比例存在明显不合理.并利用博弈论的观点分析了试点公司不合理对价方案获得高票通过的原因。最后,对上市公司股权分置改革的时机与成本关系进行了定量分析,认为在一个相对较短时间内解决股权分置问题.对于非流通股东而言最为经济。

关 键 词:股权分置改革  均衡对价  博弈  改革成本
文章编号:1006-480X(2006)02-0013-07
收稿时间:2006-01-12
修稿时间:2006-01-12

Equilibrium Formula in Shareholder Structure Reform
DING Zhi-guo,SU Zhi,DU Xiao-yu.Equilibrium Formula in Shareholder Structure Reform[J].China Industrial Economy,2006(2):113-119.
Authors:DING Zhi-guo  SU Zhi  DU Xiao-yu
Institution:Quantitative Research Center of Economies, Jilin University, Changehun 130012, China
Abstract:Basing on the fair principle and arbitrage theory,this paper gave out a Rational Consideration Formula in term of market equilibrium. Empirical analysis on 46 experimental firms and 72 firms carrying out recently shows that some consideration schemes were obviously unreasonable. In addition,we explained why the unreasonable consideration schemes have been accepted with high vote by game theory. Finally,using quantitative model,this paper analyzed the relationship between the cost and opportunity for carrying the shareholder structure reform into execution,which shows that nowadays is a very good chance to resolve the shareholder structure problem for the non-circulating shareholders and listed corporations in the term of economy.
Keywords:shareholder structure reform  equilibrium consideration  game  reform cost
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